COMPENSATION FOR SECONDARY VICTIMS AS A RESULT OF AN INTEGRITY VIOLATION

In a recent ruling (ruling Pl. ÚS 14/24 of 12 June 2024), the Constitutional Court addressed the issue of compensation for secondary victims. In this particular case, a woman had lost close family members as a result of a car accident, which had a profound impact on her mental health and caused her to have to draw an invalidity pension. Let's take a closer look at this finding, which opened up the possibility of compensation for secondary victims.

According to the current judicial practice, the degree of interference with the psychological health of the secondary victim is distinguished by distinguishing two groups of cases: a) when the secondary victim (e.g. a person close to the person killed in a car accident) suffers "only" emotional harm, and b) when he or she is diagnosed with a mental illness, the harm from shock - this then leads to an increase in the monetary compensation for emotional harm under Section 2959 of Act No. 89/2012 Coll, Civil Code (hereinafter referred to as "Civil Code").

The circumstances of the case under consideration

Before the main courts, the applicant claimed compensation for pecuniary damage to her health (or the insurance benefit intended to cover the damage) in the form of loss of earnings and reasonable medical expenses against the insurance company as an intervener. The personal injuries she sustained were the result of a traffic accident in which her daughter-in-law and two grandchildren died and which was caused by the driver of a vehicle whose operator was insured under the motor vehicle liability policy with that insurer. The fundamental question was therefore whether the operator of the vehicle was liable for the applicant's injuries.

While the Court of First Instance upheld the applicant's claim on the merits, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal unanimously concluded that the applicant's injuries were not caused by the accident in which she was not involved, but by the death of persons close to her. Thus, in the case, the Court of Appeal and the Court of Appeal did not establish a causal link between the complainant's state of health and the accident and, in the courts' view, the insurer was not obliged to pay the complainant anything.

The plaintiff was not a so-called primary victim who was entitled to compensation for damage to her health within the meaning of Section 2958 of the Civil Code, or to her property in the form of loss of earnings pursuant to Section 2962 et seq. of the Civil Code, or to the costs of treatment pursuant to Section 2960 of the Civil Code, but "only" a secondary victim who, according to the Supreme Court, was only entitled to compensation pursuant to Section 2959 of the Civil Code, i.e. the right to compensation for emotional damage.

The Constitutional Court commented on the existing case law

The occurrence of psychological harm in secondary victims is reflected in section 2959 of the Civil Code, which provides that "[i]n the case of homicide or particularly serious bodily injury, the perpetrator shall compensate the spouse, parent, child or other person close to the victim for the mental suffering by monetary compensation that fully compensates for their suffering. If the amount of compensation cannot be so determined, it shall be determined in accordance with the principles of decency.'.

However, it becomes problematic to go beyond 'mere' mental suffering into a diagnosable illness, which causes a direct interference with the physical and mental integrity of the person. The above provision does not protect health but private and family life, which is why the Supreme Court, in its case-law, has also reflected the exceeding of this notional "milestone" in the amount of non-pecuniary damage awarded. The Constitutional Court, however, has defined itself in this respect by stating that a mere increase in the amount of the non-pecuniary damage awarded (in the context of the interference with private and family life) cannot compensate for the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage to the victim's health as protected by Article 7(1) of the Charter.

In its ruling, the Constitutional Court also dealt with the issue of the causal link between the road accident and the complainant's injury or its occurrence. In particular, it called for proper reasons to be given for decisions concerning such cases, especially in view of the fact that victims (secondary victims) may suffer damage to their psychological health as a result of the accident and the death of persons close to them (i.e. causally linked to those facts). In this respect, he sided with the evolving Czech legal doctrine.

Therefore, the Constitutional Court concluded that "if a car accident results in serious bodily injury or even death of a close person, this usually represents an enormous psychological burden for the close persons as secondary victims. This was multiplied in the present case by the fact that two of the primary victims were related to the applicant by grandson/granddaughter and the third victim was her daughter-in-law. In that state of affairs, it is reasonably probable that the secondary victim's psychological health may have been affected as a result of the road accident and the deaths of those close to her, i.e. causally linked to those events. In other words, the impact on the psychological health of a person close to the victim can be regarded as being expected and adequate in similar situations - particularly in a situation where the family relations between the applicant and her son's family were, as the general courts found, demonstrably good."

In conclusion, therefore, it may be noted that proving interference with an individual's mental health is not easy in itself and requires very detailed examination and should be approached with due caution by the courts, particularly with regard to the award of compensation. It is then the distinction between 'mere' mental distress and medically identifiable interference with physical and mental integrity (typically mental illness) that is crucial to the correct sub-classification for the award of compensation.

If you have questions regarding health law or related issues, please do not hesitate to contact us. We would be happy to learn more about your case and provide you with appropriate legal assistance.

Responsible lawyer: Mgr. Mgr. Barbora Dlabolová, Kateřina Chaloupková contributed to this article.